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Truthmakers and Modality1
 
Ross P Cameron 
University of Leeds 
 
Abstract 
This paper attempts to locate, within an actualist ontology, 
truthmakers for modal truths: truths of the form <Possibly, p> or 
<Necessarily, p>.  In section 1 I motivate the demand for 
substantial truthmakers for modal truths.  In section 2 I criticise 
Armstrong’s account of truthmakers for modal truths.  In section 3 
I examine essentialism and defend an account of what makes 
essentialist attributions true, but I argue that this does not solve the 
problem of modal truth in general.  In section 4 I discuss, and 
dismiss, a theistic account of the source of modal truth proposed by 
Alexander Pruss.  In section 5 I offer a means of (dis)solving the 
problem. 
 
Michael Dummett said that the problem of necessity is twofold: “what is its source, and 
how do we recognise it?”2  While it is undoubtedly not how Dummett would have 
thought of things, I would understand the former question as asking about what part of 
our ontology truths of necessity hold in virtue of: what are the truthmakers for truths of 
the form <Necessarily, p>?  This paper will concern itself with the search for truthmakers 
for modal truths in general: when <p> is necessary, what is it in the world that makes <p 
is necessary> true; when <p> is possible, what makes <p is possible> true?   
 
1: Truthmakers for necessary truths 
 
The search for truthmakers for modal truths has not been much pursued, and some 
philosophers who are sympathetic to truthmaker theory in general have explicitly claimed 
that modal truths need no truthmakers.  Why is this?  I think two assumptions are 
generally made (albeit often implicitly): (i) that if <p> is necessary then there need not be 
a truthmaker for <p>, and (ii) that the modal truths are a subset of the necessary truths.  
Certainly this seems to be Mellor’s reason for denying that truths of the form <Possibly, 
p> have a truthmaker.  He says3
 
Because the identity of a necessary proposition entails its truth, I cannot 
see why any other entity must exist to make it true.  So, in particular, since 
any contingent proposition ‘p’ is necessarily contingent, I . . . see no need 
of a truthmaker for the necessary truth that p is contingent and hence that . 
. . ?p is possible. 
                                                 
1 Thanks to David Armstrong, Elizabeth Barnes, Bob Hale and Sonia Roca for helpful discussion. 
2 Dummett (1959), pp. 327 
3 Mellor (2003), pp. 213 
 
Generalised, the thought is that if <p> is necessary then <p is necessary> is necessary, 
and likewise if <p> is possible then <p is possible> is necessary, and hence neither of 
those propositions require truthmakers. 
 
The argument relies on the correctness of the S5 system of modal logic: the system 
according to which a proposition has its modal status as a matter of necessity.  But I am 
happy with that assumption.  I will question instead the assumption that if it’s necessary 
that p then there need be no truthmaker for <p>. 
 
Assuming (as I will be) that the truthmaker demand is not in general misguided, why 
would the demand for truthmakers go away when the truths in question are necessary?  
The general idea, I take it, is that we don’t owe an explanation for why things are such 
that p, given that there was no other option.  If things had to be such that p, then there is 
no need to explain why the actual world turns out to be a p-world. 
   
That a demand for grounding vanishes when the truth in question is necessary is a 
familiar thought.  Consider the old debate as to why there is something rather than 
nothing: it has often been thought that if there simply had to be something rather than 
nothing then there is no need for there to be some explanation as to why there is 
something.  Why is there something rather than nothing?  Well, there was no other way 
for things to be. 
 
I don’t think this gives us any reason at all to deny that necessary truths have 
truthmakers.  It seems that when we demand an explanation for why there is something 
rather than nothing we are doing something very different from asking in virtue of what 
part of ontology is there something rather than nothing.4  This last question is really easy 
to answer: every thing makes it true that there is something rather than nothing.  For all x, 
x is a truthmaker for <something exists> (since every thing is a truthmaker for the 
proposition that it itself exists).  But the puzzle of existence cannot be answered so easily: 
pointing to the existence of some thing will not satisfy one who is puzzled as to why 
there are any things in the first place!  It seems clear, then, that the demand for an 
explanation for why there is something rather than nothing is not the same as asking what 
the ontological ground is for there being something rather than nothing – the former 
question is an epistemic one, the latter metaphysical – hence we are not entitled to infer 
from the fact that, in general, the demand for explanation seems to vanish when that 
which is up for explanation is shown to be necessary that the demand for an ontological 
grounding for <p> vanishes when <p> is shown to be necessary.   
 
Here is another motivation to accept truthmakers for modal truths if you accept 
truthmakers at all.  It is natural, although not obligatory, for the truthmaker theorist to 
accept a correspondence theory of truth: that what it is for a proposition to be true is for 
the proposition to correspond to that part of the world that suffices for its truth – i.e. its 
truthmaker.  But if you think that the necessary truths don’t have truthmakers then you 
                                                 
4 I am rejecting, then, accounts which identify the demand for truthmakers with a demand for explanation, 
such as that offered by Liggins (2005) (who cites Ian McFetridge as inspiration in this regard). 
cannot say that this is what it is for a proposition that is necessarily true to be true.  In that 
case you must accept a dual theory of truth: what it is for some propositions to be true is 
not what it is for other propositions to be true.  This is unattractive.5
 
Still, one might resist the thought that modal truths need substantive truthmakers.  Even if 
one accepts that the necessary truths must have truthmakers, one might be tempted to 
give a deflationary story about the way in which they are made true.  The thought would 
be that the necessary truths are indeed made true, but they are made true “by default”: 
there are no substantial truthmakers for the necessary truths.  One potential motivation for 
thinking that necessary truths are grounded by default is if you think that it is a sufficient 
condition for x to be the truthmaker for <p> that the existence of x necessitates the truth 
of <p>.  In that case every thing is a truthmaker for every necessary truth: it is vacuously 
true that the existence of x necessitates the truth of <p>, when <p> is necessary; there are 
no possible circumstances in which x exists and <p> is false, because there are no 
possible circumstances in which <p> is false. 
 
But while I am happy to accept the orthodox position that it is a necessary condition for x 
to be the truthmaker for <p> that the existence of x necessitates the truth of <p>, I am not 
prepared to accept that it is a sufficient condition.  Indeed, with another plausible 
assumption this principle leads us into the absurd position that every object is a 
truthmaker for every truth.6  The other assumption is what Greg Restall calls the 
disjunction thesis: that if a thing (or some things) makes a disjunction true then it makes 
true one of the disjuncts.  This is a plausible sounding thesis7: a disjunction can’t be true 
without one of the disjuncts being true, and so it would seem that any thing that sufficed 
for the truth of a disjunction must also suffice for the truth of at least one of its disjuncts.  
But now consider some contingently true proposition <p>.  It is necessary that either <p> 
is true or that <¬p> is true.  By the assumption currently under attack, then, every thing is 
a truthmaker for the disjunction <pV¬p>.  In which case it follows, by the disjunction 
thesis, that every object makes one of <p> or <¬p> true.  But no object makes <¬p> true, 
because <¬p> is false.  So every object makes <p> true.  <p> was an arbitrary contingent 
proposition, so every object makes every contingent proposition true.  Since the only 
remaining true propositions are the necessary truths, the sufficiency assumption entails 
that every thing is a truthmaker for every true proposition.  I am happy to take this as a 
reductio of the view that it is a sufficient condition for x to be the truthmaker for <p> that 
the existence of x necessitates the truth of <p>. 
 
So we should abandon the claim that it is a sufficient condition for x to be the truthmaker 
for <p> that the existence of x necessitates the truth of <p>8, and with this view ruled out 
I see no reason to hold that the necessary truths are made true by default.  This means, 
                                                 
5 I owe this argument to David Armstrong.  Armstrong has taken to calling those who accept that some but 
not all truths have truthmakers ‘dualists’ about truth, hoping that the epithet will prove suitably 
embarrassing to them.  See Armstrong (2006), pp. 245. 
6 The argument in this paragraph is from Restall (1996). 
7 Although see Read (2000) for a dissenting voice. 
8 If it’s necessary but not sufficient for x to be a truthmaker for <p> that the existence of x necessitate the 
truthmaker for <p>, what more is needed?  We’ll come back to this question in section 3. 
given my argument above that the necessary truths require truthmakers as much as 
contingent ones do, that we must look for substantial truthmakers for the necessary truths.  
And so even if truths of the form ?p or ◊p are necessary, we must look for substantial 
truthmakers for them. 
 
However, our task is made easier by the following.  In a search for truthmakers for modal 
truths, we will succeed if we manage to locate truthmakers either for truths of necessity 
or for truths of possibility since, given the duality of the modal operators, lack of a 
truthmaker for <Possibly, p> or <Necessarily, p> entails the truth of <Necessarily, ?p> or 
<Possibly, ?p> respectively.  That is, if we manage to locate the truthmakers for truths of 
the form <Possibly, p>, we can conclude that the truthmaker for <Necessarily, p> is 
whatever makes it true that there is no truthmaker for <Possibly, ?p>.  Likewise, mutatis 
mutandis, if we manage to locate truthmakers for truths of necessity: we can conclude 
that <Possibly, p> is made true by the same thing that makes <There is no truthmaker for 
<Necessarily, ?p>> true.9
 
2: Armstrong on truthmakers for modal truths 
 
My goal is to locate among the ontology of the actual those objects which make modal 
truths true, for I believe the ontology of the actual exhausts what there is.  I will not be 
arguing for this actualist thesis here, I will simply assume it.  I am discounting, then, 
possibilist accounts of the source of modal truth, such as David Lewis’ modal realism.10
 
Locating actual truthmakers for modal truths is a daunting task.  As Ted Sider says, 
“Whether something is a certain way seems unproblematic, but that things might be 
otherwise, or must be as they are, seems to call out for explanation.”11  The reason for 
this is that modal facts “point beyond themselves”12 in the same way that tensed or 
dispositional facts do.  Just as it is difficult to see how presently existing things could 
account for facts concerning the past or future, it is difficult to see how actually existing 
things could account for facts concerning what might or must have been; but while many 
of us are happy to accept the truthmaker argument for the existence of non-present 
entities, there is more resistance to the analogous argument for the existence of mere 
possibilia. 
 
David Armstrong, both an actualist and a truthmaker theorist, has recently offered us a 
proof that there are truthmakers for truths of the form <Possibly, p> among the ontology 
of the actual.  He argues that we need only be concerned with truths of mere possibility, 
since he thinks that when <p> is true, the truthmaker for <p> also makes it true that <p> 
is possible.  He then goes on to argue that when <p> is merely possible (i.e. possible but 
                                                 
9 This relies on the truth of Truthmaker Maximalism: the principle that every truth has a truthmaker.  I have 
defended this principle in Cameron (2008) and Cameron (forthcoming c). 
10 Lewis (1986).  I argue against Lewisian realism in Cameron (forthcoming a). 
11 Sider (2003) pp. 184 
12 ibid. pp. 185 
false), the truthmaker for <?p> is a truthmaker (but not necessarily a minimal truthmaker) 
for <Possibly, p>.  His argument runs as follows.13
 
1) A makes <p> true      (Assumption) 
2) <p> is contingent       (Assumption) 
3) <p> entails <??p>       (From 2) 
4) If A makes <q> true and <q> entails <r>    (Assumption) 
then A makes <r> true 
5) A makes <??p> true      (From 1, 3 and 4) 
 
If this argument is sound it establishes that what makes it true that p, for some contingent 
proposition <p>, is also what makes it true that <p> could have been false, i.e. that it is 
possible that ?p. 
 
Now clearly one could reject the legitimacy of the assumption at 1, which relies on 
truthmaker maximalism – the doctrine that every truth has a truthmaker.  If maximalism 
is false the most one could get from an argument like this is that some truths of mere 
possibility have actual truthmakers.  Other truths, for example the truth that there could 
be talking donkeys, will be left unaccounted for since, in all probability, the denier of 
maximalism will also deny the claim that there is a truthmaker for the fact that there are 
no talking donkeys (since problems in locating truthmakers for negative existentials are 
one of the most cited reasons for abandoning maximalism).  Likewise, Armstrong uses 
this argument to account for the possibility of alien entities (particulars, properties and 
relations that are not combinatorially constructible from actual entities) by noticing that 
the truthmaker for the fact that all the actual things are all the actual things will be a 
truthmaker for the possibility of aliens.14  But this move, of course, requires the existence 
of totality facts which, again, the denier of maximalism will likely reject.  I, however, 
accept maximalism, so I will not press this point. 
 
Let me also pause to object to the entailment assumption (at step (4)).  Suppose <p> and 
<q> are both true.  Armstrong claims that the truthmakers for <p> and <q> are the 
truthmakers (but not necessarily the minimal truthmakers) for the conjunction <p&q>, 
and indeed the disjunctions <pVr>, <qVr>, <(p&q)Vr> etc, and any other proposition 
whose truth is entailed by <p> and <q>.  I don’t find this intuitive at all.  Isn’t the reason 
<p&q> is true because <p> is true and because <q> is true and because of the nature of 
conjunction? 
 
Now you might object: but the nature of conjunction is not a contingent matter, it doesn’t 
need to be taken into account when accounting for the truth of <p&q>.  But of course I 
reject that thought for the reasons given above, and Armstrong also rejects it.  Just 
because it is necessary that when <p> and <q> are true <p&q> is true, this doesn’t mean 
that this truth can go ungrounded.  There must be a truthmaker for the proposition that 
                                                 
13 Armstrong 2004, pp. 84.  ‘A’ and ‘<p>’ are to be read as schematic: arbitrary names for a thing and a 
proposition, respectively.  I have changed the presentation of the argument, but it remains the same as 
Armstrong's in essentials. 
14 Armstrong ibid. pp. 86–89. 
<p&q> is true given that <p> and <q> are both true, in which case what makes it true that 
p&q is not just what makes it true that p and what makes it true that q, but rather these 
things together with whatever makes it true that <p> and <q> entails <p&q>: perhaps the 
function that is conjunction. 
 
But even granting both truthmaker maximalism and the entailment assumption, 
Armstrong’s argument does not work.  It is step 3 that is worrisome.  Armstrong says that 
3 follows from 2 and “the nature of the contingency of propositions.”15  Well it certainly 
follows from the fact that <p> is contingent that <?p> is possible, but that is not what is 
being said at 3; what is being said is that it follows from <p> – the proposition itself, 
rather than the fact that it is contingent – that <?p> is possible.  And it is necessary that it 
is this claim that is being made, of course, for the application of the entailment principle 
(4); it must be <p> that entails the possibility of <?p>, not simply the fact that <p> is 
contingent, since it is <p>, and not the fact that <p> is contingent, that we know has an 
actually existing truthmaker. 
 
But does <p> entail that <?p> is possible?  Armstrong says that “Given the attractive S5 
modal system, if <p> is contingent, it is a necessary truth that it is contingent.  This may 
help to quell any doubts one may have about step 3 in the argument.”16  This is extremely 
odd.  If S5 is true and entailment is classical then step 3 is justified; but then the above 
proof is not needed.  Simply from step 4 we can prove that every thing that is a 
truthmaker for any truth is a truthmaker for truths of possibility, since truths of possibility 
are themselves necessary (in S5) and necessary truths are (classically) entailed by any set 
of formulae.  Since every thing is a truthmaker for some proposition (a thing makes true 
the proposition that that thing exists, if nothing else) it follows that every thing makes 
truths of possibility true, since modal truths are entailed by all propositions.  Armstrong, 
however, does not want the notion of entailment in the assumption at (4) to be classical, 
for he does not want to hold that necessary truths are made true by every thing.17  He 
thinks, and I agree, that this is too easy a solution to the problem of necessary truths to be 
adequate.  Indeed, the entailment assumption is utterly hopeless if entailment is classical 
and Restall’s disjunction principle true: for <pV¬p> is classically entailed by anything, in 
which case every truthmaker, by the entailment assumption, makes true every instance of 
<pV¬p>, in which case, given the disjunction principle, every truthmaker makes true 
every truth; and we’re back to the implausible claim that every object makes every truth 
true. 
 
Some kind of relevant entailment is required, then, in the formulation of the entailment 
principle at (4).  But in that case, even if one believes S5 to be the correct system of 
modal logic, this will not “quell the doubts” about step 3, for <p> does not relevantly 
entail <??p>, no matter whether or not <??p> is necessary.18  Armstrong cannot have his 
cake and eat it: if he wishes to appeal to relevant entailment then he is not justified in 
                                                 
15 ibid. pp. 84 
16 ibid. pp. 84–85. 
17 Armstrong (2003), pp. 10–11. 
18 For the classic exposition of relevance logic see Anderson and Belnap (1975). 
making the move from 2 to 3; he is justified in making this move if he wishes to appeal to 
classical entailment and S5, but at the cost of trivialising truthmakers for necessary truths. 
 
Now in fact Armstrong had put forward a different version of the argument in an earlier 
paper which avoids this particular worry.  That version ran as follows19
 
1) A makes <p> true        (Assumption) 
2) A  makes <p is contingent> true      (Assumption) 
3) A makes <p and <p> is contingent> true   (From 1 and 2) 
4) <p and <p> is contingent> entails <??p> 
5) If A makes <q> true and <q> entails <r>    (Assumption) 
then A makes <r> true 
6) A makes <??p> true      (From 3, 4 and 5) 
 
In this version of the argument 2 is not being said to follow from 1 but is an explicit 
assumption of the argument.  Well, in this case I have no problem with the validity of the 
argument.  Sure, if A makes it true that <p> is contingent, and if the entailment principle 
is true, then A makes it true that <?p> is possible.  But I question Armstrong's right to 
make the assumption at 2, for it seems simply to beg the question: if one doubts that the 
possibility of <?p> obtains in virtue of A then it is not clear why one would be willing to 
accept that the contingency of <p> obtains in virtue of A.  The contingency of a true 
proposition just is the conjunction of its truth and the possibility of its negation.  Now we 
know, ex hypothesi, that the truth of <p> obtains in virtue of A; in that case isn't the 
further claim that A also accounts for the contingency of <p> simply tantamount to 
claiming that A also suffices for the possibility of the negation of <p>?  But that is 
precisely what the argument is aiming to prove, so it can't be presupposed by any premise 
without begging the question. 
 
Armstrong offers the following rather obscure defence of premise 2: 
 
A is something in the world, some state of affairs or other entity depending 
on just what truthmakers are postulated, a matter that depends on one's 
whole metaphysics.  Whatever A is, in the cases we are considering it is a 
contingent being.  Could the contingency of A lie outside A?  It does not 
seem possible.  It cannot be a relation that A has to something beyond itself.  
So A is the truthmaker for the proposition <p is contingent>.20
 
This last “so” is completely beyond me!  Certainly Armstrong must hold that A is a 
contingent being, given the contingency of <p> and truthmaker necessitarianism – the 
claim that the existence of a thing necessitates the truth of any proposition it makes true.  
                                                 
19 ibid, pp. 15.  Again, the presentation is changed from Armstrong, but not in any way that affects the 
argument.  Armstrong, in the later work, thanks Marian David for offering a simplification of this 
argument, so I suppose it is David that is to blame for the introduction of the particular problem noted 
above. 
20 ibid.  I have changed occurrences of ‘T’, which is what Armstrong names the truthmaker for <p>, to ‘A’; 
I have not used ‘T’ because I want to avoid any possible confusion with a truth predicate. 
The next point seems to be that A is the truthmaker for its own contingency: that is, that 
<A might not have existed> is true in virtue of A.  Well that's not obvious, but even 
granting this how are we supposed to go from this to the claim that A is the truthmaker 
for <??p>?  It does not follow from the fact that the truthmaker for <p> might not have 
existed that <p> is contingent, for it may be necessary that there exists some truthmaker 
for <p> even if it is not necessary that the actual truthmaker for <p> exists.  (Armstrong 
is not committed to, nor should one accept, the claim that if <p> is made true by A then 
necessarily if <p> is true it is made true by A.  <There is a human> is made true by many 
individuals, all of whom might not have existed and that proposition still have been made 
true.)  So even if A makes it true both that p and that A might not have existed, we do not 
seem to have anything to suggest that A makes it true that <?p> is possible; for all that 
has been said so far it may be that in all the worlds in which A does not exist there is 
some other thing that makes it true that p.  And so the argument for premise 2 is 
unconvincing; all Armstrong can do is assume premise 2, which begs the question. 
 
Armstrong’s proof that the ontology of the actual suffices to ground the truths of 
possibility is unconvincing.  Nor do I think we should accept his particular account of 
what in fact makes truths of possibility true.  Armstrong accepts a combinatorial account 
of possibility.  Consider the possibly true proposition <There is a unicorn>.21  Armstrong 
aims to account for this possibility combinatorially; what makes <Possibly, there are 
unicorns> true, says Armstrong, just are actually existing things that are combinable to 
make a unicorn: say an actual horse and an actual horn.  Of course we also need the truth 
that these actual things are combinable, since some actual entities are not, such as 
roundness and squareness.  So what makes it true that these particular things – this horse 
and this horn – are combinable?  No more than the horse and the unicorn themselves, 
says Armstrong, since their combinability is necessitated by their nature (while the non-
combinability of roundness and squareness is necessitated by their nature).22
 
But even if this works in this particular case, there are unacceptable limits to this 
combinatorial account of possibility.  For a start, the possibility of aliens is left 
unaccounted for.  By definition aliens are not the result of any combination of actual 
entities and so, since we have rejected Armstrong's suggestion that the truthmakers for 
claims concerning the possibility of aliens are totality facts concerning all the things there 
in fact are, this possibility is left ungrounded. 
 
What of truths of necessity?  Unfortunately, when dealing with necessity, instead of 
focussing on truths of the form <Necessarily, p>, Armstrong turns his attention to truths 
of the form <p> which happen to be necessary.  When discussing possibility he considers 
propositions such as <Possibly, there are unicorns>, but when discussing necessity he 
considers propositions such as <7+5=12> when he should be considering propositions 
such as <Necessarily, 7+5=12>.  But let us look at what he thinks the truthmaker for 
<7+5=12> is, since it may shed light on the truthmaker for <Necessarily, 7+5=12>. 
 
                                                 
21 You might, following Kripke (1981, pp. 23–24, 157–158), deny that this proposition could be true.  I find 
Kripke’s reasoning unconvincing; but in any case, I will stick with Armstrong’s example. 
22 Armstrong (2004), pp. 91–93. 
Armstrong offers two accounts of what makes <7+5=12> true.  On the simpler account, it 
is simply the numbers involved: 7, 5 and 12.  Why?  Because “Given the entities 7, 5 and 
12, then they must, necessarily must, be related in this way [I.e. such that when you add 
the first two you get the last]. . . So (by the entailment principle) truthmakers for the 
existence of the entities should be a sufficient truthmaker for the necessary truth.”23  
Armstrong thinks that whatever makes it true that the numbers exist, namely the 
numbers, also makes true the truths of mathematics. 
 
This opens the door to the claim that those numbers also make <Necessarily, 7+5=12> 
true.  This can be justified in one of two ways.  Firstly, we can appeal to the further two 
premises that (i) the numbers are themselves necessary existents and (ii) that any thing 
which exists necessarily makes it true that it exists necessarily.  Or, secondly, we can 
follow Armstrong in his claim that all that is required for the truth of <7=5=12> is the 
possibility of the existence of the numbers 7, 5 and 12.  In that case, since it is plausible 
(given the characteristic axiom of the B system of modal logic24) that those numbers 
make it true that they necessarily could exist, they will also make it true that <7+5=12> is 
necessary. 
 
This attempt at grounding the truth of <Necessarily, 7+5=12> is heavily dependent on 
particular positions in the philosophy of maths.  If you incline towards a kind of 
structuralist view whereby the truths of mathematics depend on there being entities that 
are numbers, but you hold that different sequences of entities can play the role of the 
numbers in different possible worlds, then nothing like Armstrong’s account can work, 
for we will be left seeking a grounding for <Necessarily, some entities play the numbers 
role>.  But more importantly, it’s far from clear how Armstrong’s view is meant to 
generalise to necessary truths that do not appear to be about the properties of a domain of 
necessary existents, such as, for example, <Necessarily, for any collection of things, there 
is a mereological sum of those things> or <Necessarily, there are impure sets iff there are 
concrete objects>.25  And so I conclude that Armstrong's attempt to locate truthmakers 
for modal truths among actuality is unconvincing. 
 
3: Truthmakers, essence and modality 
 
In section 2 I argued that, while necessary, it is not sufficient for an entity e to be a 
truthmaker for a proposition <p> that <p> is true in every world in which e exists.  What 
more is needed then?  I suggest we make appeal to the notion of essence.  Since the work 
of Fine (1994), the idea that essence is finer grained than de re modality has become very 
credible.  While Socrates couldn’t exist without being a member of the singleton 
{Socrates}, it is not of Socrates’ essence to belong to any set.  While you and I could not 
exist without being distinct, it is not of the essence of either of us that we be distinct from 
the other.  Similarly, while I couldn’t exist and <2+2=4> be false, I do not think that 
makes me a truthmaker for that proposition, precisely because it is not of my essence that 
                                                 
23 ibid. pp. 98–99. 
24 B: p??◊p 
25 C.f. my objection to Fine at the end of the next section. 
any mathematical proposition be true; whereas it is of my essence that I be human, and 
hence I am a suitable truthmaker for the proposition that I am human. 
 
What makes essentialist attributions themselves true?  The hopeful thought is that it is 
simply A itself that makes it true that A is essentially F.  For if it is otherwise, trouble 
looms.  Suppose A makes it true that p.  What makes it true that A makes it true that p?  
We really want to answer that it is A that makes this true, otherwise we appear to be off 
on an infinite regress.  If it is not A, but rather some thing B, that makes it true that A 
makes it true that p, then what makes it true that B makes this true?  If not B, but some 
other thing C, then what makes it true that C makes it true that B makes it true that A 
makes it true that p?  If not C then . . . And so on, ad infinitum. 
 
So we want to secure, if we can, the claim that whenever A makes it true that p, A is the 
truthmaker for <A makes it true that p>.  A makes it true that p in virtue of having the 
essential properties it in fact has; so it seems that we can only secure the thought that A 
makes <A makes it true that p> true if A also makes it true that A has the essential 
properties it has.  That is, that for all of A’s essential properties F, A makes true the 
proposition <A is essentially F>. 
 
But this view is not without its problems: there are arguments in the literature to the 
effect that A could exist and have different properties as its essential properties.  Consider 
cases of objects with ‘variable essences’ in the following sense: that it is essential to them 
that they have some sufficient number of a certain set of properties, but that it is not 
essential to them that they have all the properties in that set.  Nathan Salmon26, for 
example, asks us to consider a ship, S, built of 100 planks of wood, call them P1 to P100.  
The ship could survive the loss of some of its parts, so it is not essential to S that it is 
built from P1 to P100, but it couldn’t have been built, thinks Salmon, from completely 
different planks.  A ship built from planks P101 to P20027 would not be the very ship S, but 
some other ship.  If he is right then S has the property ‘has P1 2 
100 
as a part, or has P as a part, 
or . . . or has P as a part’ essentially: there is no world in which S exists and lacks this 
property.  And this is not only de re necessary of the ship, but essential to it, because if it 
did not have any of those planks as a part it would not be the very ship S. 
 
If the hopeful thought is true then, S must make it true that S has this property essentially, 
in which case there must be no possible situation in which S exists and it be possible that 
S have none of P1 to P100 as parts.  But this is not obviously the case; for consider a world 
w1 in which S has some different parts, say P1 to P97 and P101 to P103.  What are the 
essential properties of S in this world?  Is it essential to S that it has either P1 as a part, or 
has P2 as a part, or . . . or has P100 as a part, or is it essential to S that it has either P1 as a 
part, or has P2 as a part, or . . . or has P97 as a part, or has P101 as a part . . . or has P103 as a 
part?  There is some pressure to say the latter.  For it seems that the planks that S could 
have been made from in a world are determined by the planks that it is made from in that 
world, not the planks it is actually made from.  Why would the essence of S in w1 have 
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27 Let us assume for simplicity that each plank has only one name, and so we know that P101 is distinct from 
P1, etc. 
anything to do with the planks P98, P99 and P100 when these planks are not parts of S in 
w1?  But if the planks that S could have been made from in a world depend on what it is 
made from in that very world, and not what it is made from in the actual world, then we 
are going to be able to construct a series of possible worlds the last of which is one in 
which S exists and does not have the property ‘has P1 as a part, or has P2 as a part, or . . . 
or has P100 as a part’ essentially (although it will still have that property in that world).  In 
that case, S cannot be the truthmaker for <It is essential to S that it has P1 as a part, or has 
P2 as a part, or . . . or has P100 as a part> since S’s existence does not necessitate the truth 
of this proposition. 
 
How should we respond?  I think the hopeful thought – that whenever a thing is 
essentially some way, it itself is the truthmaker for the proposition that it is that way 
essentially – is so advantageous and intuitive that holding onto it is worth denying the 
admittedly intuitive thought that what is essential to a thing in a world w is determined by 
how that thing is in w rather than how it actually is.  I suggest that we accept that even 
had S been made of the planks P1 to P97 and P101 to P103 S it would have been essential to 
S that S be composed of a sufficient number of P1 to P100, since those are the planks S is 
actually made from.28  I am advocating privileging actuality in a certain way, then, that 
would be abhorrent to the Lewisian realist about worlds, but is hopefully not so 
unattractive to the actualist. 
 
We have our answer as to what makes it true that some thing is essentially some way: it is 
the very thing itself that makes this true.  Essentialist attributions are made true by the 
actual objects they concern.  What of de re modal propositions?  It is overwhelmingly 
plausible that when essence and de re modality coincide, the propositions have the same 
truthmaker: so when a is essentially F, not only does a make it true that a is essentially F, 
a also makes it true that a couldn’t exist and fail to be F.  The tricky case is when essence 
and de re modality diverge: what makes it true that a is necessarily F when a is not 
essentially F? 
 
It seems likely that whenever a is necessarily F but not essentially F there is some other 
thing that is essentially such that a is F, and which would therefore be a suitable 
truthmaker for <a is necessarily F>.  So, for example, in the case of Socrates and his 
singleton, while Socrates is not essentially a member of his singleton, his singleton is 
essentially such that Socrates is a member of it, and hence is a suitable truthmaker for 
<Socrates is necessarily a member of {Socrates}>; while neither you nor I are essentially 
distinct from the other, our mereological sum essentially has us as distinct parts, and so is 
a suitable truthmaker for the fact that we are necessarily distinct. 
 
So it looks not unreasonable to hope that in providing an ontological grounding for 
claims of essence, we succeed in providing an ontological grounding for all claims of de 
re necessity.  But what of de dicto modal truth?  What in actuality gives grounding to the 
fact that certain false propositions might have been true, or that certain true propositions 
                                                 
28 C.f. the discussion in Roca Royes (2006).  Note that this view lets us avoid Salmon’s objections to the 
characteristic axiom of S4 (?p???p) (ibid.), which rely on the thought that the essential properties of a 
thing in w are determined by the constitution of that thing in w, not its actual constitution. 
couldn’t have been false?  Having had such success with essence, we might wish to 
reduce modality de dicto to truths concerning essence, thereby locating the source of all 
modal truth in the essence of what there actually is.  This project would be in the spirit of 
Fine (1994), who wishes to locate the source of all de dicto necessary truths among the 
essences of all the (actual) things.  He says 
 
Certainly, there is a connection between the two concepts [essence and 
modality].  For any essentialist attribution will give rise to a necessary 
truth; if certain objects are essentially related then it is necessarily true that 
the objects are so related . . . the resulting necessary truth . . . is true in 
virtue of the objects in question; the necessity has its source in those 
objects which are the subject of the underlying essentialist claim.29
 
[W]e should view metaphysical necessity as a special case of essence.  For 
each class of objects . . . will give rise to its own domain of necessary 
truths, the truths which flow from the nature of the objects in question.  
The metaphysically necessary truths can then be identified with the 
propositions which are true in virtue of the nature of all objects 
whatever.30
 
But Fine has only argued that essence gives rise to metaphysical necessity, he has not 
given us any reason to think that every metaphysically necessary truth arises from some 
truth concerning the essence of some thing(s), he merely assumes it.  And it seems highly 
dubious to me that all the metaphysically necessary propositions have their source in 
some essentialist attribution.  Consider, for example, the truth <Necessarily, if there is a 
thing, there is the singleton of that thing>.  In virtue of what is this true?  I am at a loss to 
identify some actual thing whose essential properties account for this truth.  For this 
necessary truth does not speak about the actual things in the world – it does not say that 
for all x, necessarily, if x exists then the singleton of x exists; rather, it says that no matter 
what had existed, each thing would have had a singleton.  And so none of the actual 
singletons, or their members, seem to ground this necessary truth. 
 
4: Modality, powers and God 
 
Alexander Pruss31 has recommended an account of the source of modal truth that is 
Aristotelian in its inspiration but which relies on the existence of God.  The Aristotelian 
thought is that substances come ready made with certain capacities.  My wife and I, for 
example, have the power to beget a child; an acorn has the power to grow into a tree.  
Now suppose my wife and I never actually have a child, and that the acorn in fact never 
grows into a tree.  Nevertheless, we could have a child, and the acorn could have grown 
into a tree.  So the combined powers of my wife and me, and the powers of the acorn, 
seem, on the face of it, to account for the de dicto possibilities that there could have been 
more people than in fact there are, and that there could have been more trees, 
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30 Fine (1994), pp. 9 
31 Pruss (2002) 
respectively.  These possibilities appear to be grounded in our capacities: that is, the 
truthmaker for the proposition that these situations are possible seems to be simply me 
and my wife, together with our powers, and by the acorn and its powers, respectively.  
These powers are actually existing entities, so we have located truthmakers for some de 
dicto modal claims among the ontology of the actual.  The problem is that even if you are 
prepared to buy into the Aristotelian idea that substances have certain powers which 
ground certain possibilities, there are certain situations which are intuitively possible but 
which don’t look to be grounded by the powers of any substance. 
 
Intuitively, I am a contingent being – I might not have existed.  What, for the 
Aristotelian, grounds this possibility?  Presumably, it is my parents; for just as it was 
within their power to beget me, it was also within their power not to, and had they 
exercised the latter power I would not have existed.  And the truthmaker for the truth that 
my parents might not have existed is, in turn, their parents.  But what about the highly 
intuitive possibility that none of the actual contingently existing substances existed – 
what is the truthmaker for the truth that this situation is possible?32  It can’t be any of the 
actual contingently existing beings, for none of these beings has the capacity to bring it 
about that it itself never existed.  And there are other possibilities that the Aristotelian 
account looks hard pushed to ground, such as the possibility of there being different 
global laws of nature, or in general possibilities concerning how the world could have 
been globally. 
 
But as Pruss points out, if there is a necessarily existing God, then we can appeal to God 
as the truthmaker for these recalcitrant possibilities.  What grounds the fact that there 
could have been none of the actual contingently existing beings? – God grounds this fact, 
because it is within God’s powers not to have created any of the contingent beings he 
actually created.  Likewise, God could have created the world to run according to 
different laws, etc.33
 
What should we say about Pruss’ theistic account of the source of modal truth?  Many 
philosophers would no doubt reject it simply because it is a theistic account, and they do 
not accept the existence of God, but I don’t want to rule it out so simply for two reasons.  
Firstly, the game we are playing allows that we admit into our ontology otherwise 
objectionable things on the grounds that the hypothesis that they exist has eminent utility, 
so even if you don’t believe in God you should be open to the possibility that you should 
become a theist if the existence of God provides the best account of modal truth, just as 
Lewis wishes us to be open to the possibility that we should become believers in the 
plurality of worlds for the same reason.  Secondly, it will be far more interesting if we 
can provide an internal objection to Pruss’ account; i.e. a reason not to accept his theistic 
grounding of modal truth even on the assumption that God exists.  That is what I will try 
                                                 
32 As Pruss points out, we must distinguish the allegedly possible situation under discussion from one in 
which there are no contingent beings.  The possibility of the latter situation is a topic of much debate (For a 
critical survey of the issues see Cameron (2006)), but the possibility that none of the actual contingent 
beings exist is far less controversial. 
33 The account also offers a nice explanation for why God is a necessary existent.  God is necessary 
precisely because, as powerful as He is, not even He could make it such that He never existed. 
to do: to show that even if there is a God it is not acceptable to ground modal truth in the 
powers of God. 
 
Here is the worry.  Pruss’s account of the source of de dicto modal truth in general is this: 
if <p> is possible, it is so in virtue of God’s capacity to create a world in which <p> 
holds; if <p> is necessary, it is so in virtue of God’s incapacity to create a world in which 
<p> fails to hold.  God’s powers are what grounds what could and what must have been.  
Something is possible because God could have actualised it.  But a traditional tenet of 
theism is that God is omnipotent – that anything that is possible is within his power – and 
this suggests that God could have actualised something because it is within the realm of 
possibility, not vice-versa. 
 
This is an instance of the familiar Euthyphro contrast.  Theists are mostly agreed that it is 
within God’s power to create a world such that p if and only if it is possible for there to 
be a world such that p.  But simply committing oneself to the (necessary) truth of the 
biconditional leaves the direction of explanation open: is it within God’s power to create 
a p-world because <p> is possible, or is <p> possible because it is within God’s power to 
create a p-world?  In claiming God, with His powers, as the ground for modal truth Pruss 
commits himself to a situation being possible because it is within God’s power. 
 
Pruss’s position regarding possibility is analogous to the divine command theorist’s 
position regarding goodness.  The divine command theorist holds that an action is good 
because God commands it (as opposed to God commanding it because it is good).  This 
immediately leads to the following worries: (i) if God had commanded us to rape, the 
divine command theorist has us believe, it would have been good for us to commit rape.  
But this is counter-intuitive. (ii) the theist asserts that God’s law is good, but if the divine 
command theorist is right, this is simply a trivial truth: it doesn’t say anything substantial 
about God’s law, because what it is to be good just is to be God’s law. 
 
Now there is perhaps no parallel to the first problem for Pruss that is worrying.  The 
supposed problem for the divine command theorist seems to rely on the thought that rape 
is bad no matter what.  If so, then the problem loses its bite if what God 
commands/approves of/forbids is essential to Him, for then the result that rape is bad no 
matter what is secured.  Since God forbids rape no matter what, rape is bad no matter 
what.  Who cares that rape would have been good had God, per impossibile, commanded 
us to rape?  So it looks like there is only a problem for the divine command theorist if 
God could have commanded different things from what He actually commanded.  Now 
whatever the plausibility of the claim that what God commands He commands 
essentially, the parallel essentialist thought in the modal case is very plausible: that God’s 
powers are essential to Him.  So while Pruss is committed to the counterfactual ‘had it 
not been within God’s power not to create George Bush, George Bush would have been a 
necessary existent’ this does not seem troublesome: who cares what would have been the 
case had God’s powers, per impossibile, been so limited?  But the problem for Pruss that 
is analogous to the second of the problems for the divine command theorist does seem to 
me to be something the theist should be concerned about.  The theist thinks herself to be 
saying something substantial about God when she claims He is omnipotent.  But if Pruss 
is right, she is not; it is trivially true that God can do anything possible, since what it is to 
be possible just is to be something that God can do.   
 
How should one sympathetic to Pruss’s account respond to this worry?  Well, how should 
the divine command theorist respond to the objection that according to them ‘God’s law 
is good’ is trivially true?  They should, I think, point out that their position concerns 
solely the source of goodness, not the meaning of the term ‘good’.  To claim that the 
truth of moral propositions holds in virtue of God’s commands is not to say that ‘good’ 
means ‘approved of by God’.  Thus divine command theory is in no way committed to 
‘what God commands is good’ being an analytic truth.34  Compare the familiar response 
to Moore’s open question argument on behalf of the ethical naturalist: it doesn’t follow 
from goodness being Φ-ness that ‘is goodness Φ-ness?’ is a closed question, for it doesn’t 
follow from goodness being Φ-ness that ‘goodness’ means ‘Φ-ness’.35  Likewise, it 
doesn’t follow from the fact that to be possible is to be within God’s power that ‘being 
within God’s power’ means ‘is possible’ – we are concerned with the metaphysical 
grounding of the modal, not with giving an analysis of modal language – and so Pruss is 
not committed to the claim that ‘God is omnipotent’ is an analytic truth. 
 
But even if ‘God is omnipotent’ need not be taken to be analytic, Pruss’ account still 
seems to make it trivial in an objectionable way.  When the theist says that God could not 
make a square circle, or make a married bachelor, or make 2+2 equal 5, she does not tend 
to think of this as being any serious limitation on God’s powers precisely because such 
things are impossible, whereas on Pruss’s account they are impossible because they are 
beyond the limits of God’s powers.  Indeed, some theists, including Descartes, have even 
wanted to claim that God can do the impossible.  If Pruss is right Descartes’ view is a 
priori false, because what it is to be possible is simply for it to be within God’s power, 
but it seems to me that this should remain an open option for the theist.  The option may 
not seem very appetising when we consider propositions such as <there is a round 
square>, but it may seem more so when we consider propositions such as <there is an 
abundance of unnecessary evil (i.e. evil that is not for the purpose of some compensating 
good)>.  The theist may well want to consider this proposition a necessary falsehood on 
the grounds that God exists necessarily and is essentially wholly good, omnipotent and 
omniscient.  Since the existence of unnecessary evil appears to be incompatible with the 
existence of a wholly good, omnipotent, omniscient being, God’s necessary existence 
rules out even the possibility of unnecessary evil.  Now, I’m not claiming the theist 
should think that: only that it would not be implausible for them to think that.  But the 
theist who accepted this would probably not think herself thereby committed to it not 
being with God’s ability to create a world with unnecessary evil.  God has the power to 
inflict evils on his creation that are not for the purpose of any greater good, but, 
necessarily, as a result of his goodness He will never use this power.  There is a perfectly 
good sense, then, in which God can do the impossible: He has the power to bring about 
things that do not obtain in any possible world.  Pruss’s account cannot accommodate 
such a possibility so, since it seems to me to be a perfectly sensible thing for the theist to 
believe, I don’t think even the theist should accept Pruss’s account. 
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There is another problem to Pruss’s view.  It does nothing at all to illuminate modal 
epistemology, for discovering what is within God’s powers looks no easier than 
discovering what is possible.  Divine knowledge is no less mysterious (perhaps more 
mysterious?) than modal knowledge.  Pruss does not meet Peacocke’s ‘Integration 
Challenge’: the demand to reconcile the metaphysics of a discourse with how we come to 
know (some of) the true propositions of that discourse.36  I think this is a severe 
disadvantage of the account.  It is not clear how we could even in principle know what 
God is capable of.  That is, it’s not clear how we could know that God is capable of 
making a world where p is true unless we relied on the inference from the possibility of p 
and God’s omnipotence to it being within God’s capacity to create a world where p is 
true.  But, of course, such an inference gets things the wrong way round on Pruss’ 
account: we should be inferring instead the possibility of p from it being within God’s 
power that p.  My complaint then is that knowing what God is capable of is only possible 
if God’s capabilities are dependent on what is possible; giving God’s capabilities priority, 
as Pruss does, makes it a mystery what His capabilities are, and hence makes it a mystery 
what is merely possible or necessary. 
 
5: Modality and Naturalness 
 
I have looked at a number of attempts to ground modal truth and found them wanting.  
But perhaps we are making the problem more difficult than it should be.  There has been, 
so far, no mention of the Leibnizian biconditional: <Necessarily, p> iff <p> is true at all 
possible worlds; and I know of no actualist account of the source of necessity that makes 
serious use of this biconditional.  On the face of it, that’s strange.  If truths of possibility 
are a kind of existential (there is a possible world at which <p> is true) and truths of 
necessity a kind of negative existential (there is no possible world at which <p> is false) 
then we might expect whatever story we tell regarding positive and negative existential 
claims elsewhere to help us in the modal case. 
 
The problem for the actualist, of course, is that in order to account for the possibility of 
<p> it is not sufficient merely to account for the existence of a world such that p: one 
must also account for the fact that this is one of the possible worlds, and not an 
impossible world.  For the Lewisian realist, to be a world just is to be a possible world; 
there are no impossible worlds, and this is a result of the fact that modal truths are simply 
analysed in terms of what is true at a world.  For the actualist, however, there will be 
impossible worlds in whatever sense that there are possible worlds.  If for example, as I 
myself hold, worlds are sets of propositions, there will be sets all of whose members 
could not be true together just as there will be sets all of whose members could be true 
together.  To account for the truth of the existential proposition <There is a possible 
world at which p>, then, we need to account both for the existence of a world at which 
<p> and for the possibility of this world.  Accounting for the existential is simple: <a 
exists> is made true by a.  It is accounting for the possibility of the world that is hard. 
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I want to dissolve this problem rather than solve it.  I think the problem of accounting for 
the possibility of the possible worlds rests on the assumption that the distinction between 
the possible worlds and the impossible worlds is a natural distinction, and I want to reject 
this assumption.37
 
Natural distinctions carve the world at its joints, unnatural distinctions do not.  There is, 
plausibly, a natural distinction between the things that are red and the things that are not 
red, but there is no natural distinction between the things that are grue38 and the things 
that are not grue.  When there is a natural distinction between the Fs and the non-Fs there 
is objective similarity between the Fs, whereas two Gs may be objectively very dissimilar 
if the distinction between the Gs and the non-Gs is an unnatural one: two things need not 
resemble one another in any objective sense just because they share the property being 
red or being a microwave oven, and that is because the distinction between the things that 
are red or microwave ovens and the things that are neither is not a natural distinction – it 
does not carve the world at a joint. 39
 
Whether or not the distinction between the Fs and the non-Fs is a natural one has 
consequences for what is needed to make true the proposition that one of the Fs is an F.  
There is pressure to believe in a property of red-ness to account for truths of the form <a 
is red>, but there is no pressure to believe in a property of grue-ness to account for truths 
of the form <a is grue>.  <a is grue> is true not in virtue of the state of affairs of a being 
grue, but in virtue of the state of affairs of a being green, or the state of affairs of a being 
blue (whichever it is that exists) together with whatever makes it true or false that a was 
examined at t.  The lesson is that when the distinction between the Fs and the non-Fs is 
an unnatural one, an F is an F not in virtue of instantiating some unnatural property but in 
virtue of instantiating its natural properties.  We need to admit into our ontology 
properties and/or states of affairs to ground things falling on either side of the natural 
divisions in the world, but once we have done that we get the facts concerning the 
unnatural divisions for free. 
 
As I said, I think the worry about accounting for the possibility of the possible worlds 
rests on the assumption that there is a natural distinction between the possible worlds and 
the impossible worlds.  Were there such a natural distinction it looks like we would need 
to admit the existence of some natural property – the property of representing a 
possibility – that is had by all and only the possible worlds, and this looks very 
unattractive.  It’s as if we’re saying that some of the worlds come with a special glow – 
the glow of possibility – but we’re not saying anything about what this glow is, or how 
we can detect it; and that’s just bad metaphysics. 
 
But what pressure is there to think that the distinction between the possible worlds and 
the impossible worlds is a natural one?  Why should we think that our modal notions 
carve the world at its joints?  No reason, I suggest.  I recommend abandoning this 
                                                 
37 I draw here on some of the ideas from Cameron (forthcoming b). 
38 Something is grue iff it is either green and examined before time t or blue and not examined before time 
t.  See Goodman (1954). 
39 For discussions of naturalness see, inter alia, Lewis (1983, 1986) and Sider (1993, 1995). 
assumption.  There is nothing more to a world’s being a possible world, I suggest, other 
than that it represents the actual laws of logic, the actual mathematical truths, the actual 
natural kind identities, etc40, as being true, and that it doesn’t represent as true anything 
that contradicts any of these truths.41  In that case, to account for the fact that some world 
w is a possible world, we need only account for the fact that the actual truths concerning 
logic/mathematics/natural kind identity etc are represented as being true by w, and that 
nothing that is incompatible with any of these truths is represented as being true by w.  So 
let S be the set of all and only the propositions that w represents as being true: whatever 
makes it true that w represents all and only the members of S as being true will also make 
it true that w is a possible world42 – and it is plausible that this is merely w itself.43  w is 
a suitable truthmaker for <w is a possible world>, then, since a possible world is possible 
solely in virtue of representing as true all and only the propositions it in fact represents as 
true.  So w makes true both that p is true according to it and that it itself is a possible 
world; since the possibility of <p> simply amounts to <p>’s being true at some possible 
worlds, it follows that w makes true the proposition <Possibly, p>. 
 
 The Leibnizian biconditional doesn’t offer any hope for solving the problem of the 
source of modal truth if we think that there is something more to a world’s being possible 
than that it represents as true the propositions it in fact represents as true, for in that case 
the problem is simply shifted to accounting for the world having this extra feature.  I see 
no need to posit this extra feature.  There is no natural distinction between the possible 
worlds and the impossible worlds – no ‘glow of possibility’; the property of representing 
a possible maximal state of affairs is no more and no less than the highly unnatural 
property of representing as true the actual truths concerning logic, mathematics, natural 
                                                 
40 I’m deliberately leaving it open here what exactly a world has to be like to count as possible because I 
want to separate my account of the source of necessity with any claim concerning the extent of necessity.  
All that I am committing myself to is that there is some list of true propositions such that a world is 
possible iff it represents all those propositions as being true, and that a possible world is possible solely in 
virtue of representing those propositions as being true.  I am not even committing myself to the claim that 
such a list will be finitely statable. 
41 This last conjunct is needed because there are impossible worlds where every necessary truth is true and 
some impossible truths are true as well, so we can’t say that a world gets to be possible just by representing 
all the necessary truths as true.  This means that we can’t make do in what follows simply with finding a 
truthmaker for the fact that w represents as true all the necessary truths – we also need a truthmaker for the 
fact that w doesn’t represent as true any impossibility.  This will be taken care of if we can find a 
truthmaker for the fact that w makes all and only the members of S true; my claim is that w is this 
truthmaker. 
42 This relies on the thought that motivates the S5 system: that the modal status of a proposition isn’t itself 
something that can change from world to world.  As I said earlier, I find this very intuitive.  The major 
reasons against accepting S5 seem to be the Salmon counterexamples to S4; but as we saw in section 3, I 
resist those. 
43There are various conceptions according to which it is plausible that w itself makes it true that w represent 
s all and only the members of S as being true.  If worlds are sets of propositions, for example, a proposition 
<p> is true according to w just in case <p> is a member of w.  Since sets have their members essentially, w 
will thus be a suitable truthmaker for <<p> is a member of w> and hence for <p is true according to w>; it 
will also, for the same reason, be a suitable truthmaker for <¬p is not true according to w>.  The claim is 
also plausible if one has a ‘magical ersatzist’ account of worlds (see Lewis (1986, pp. 174–191)).  I don’t 
want to commit myself to a particular ersatzist account of possible worlds here; the ontology one opts for at 
the end of the day will be driven by issues that cut across the present debate, such as the need to avoid the 
Cantorian paradoxes that lurk in this area. 
kind identity, etc.44  Once we’ve provided an ontological grounding for a world 
representing what it does, we get the modal facts for free: and all we need to ground the 
former is simply the worlds themselves. 
 
So what makes <Possibly, p> true is just any of the possible worlds that represent <p> as 
being the case, since all it takes for <p> to be possible is that it is true at some possible 
world, and all it takes for a possible world to be possible is that it represents as true what 
it in fact represents as true, and worlds make true propositions concerning what they 
themselves represent.  The ontology of abstract possible worlds is all we need to account 
for modal truth.  And what makes <Necessarily, p> true?  Whatever makes it true that 
there is no truthmaker for <Possibly, ?p>; and here we can appeal to whatever story we 
tell elsewhere concerning negative existentials.45, 46
 
The problem has seemed harder than it is because of the assumption that there is some 
natural distinction between the possible and the impossible worlds.  Such a distinction 
demands an ontological grounding, and this is what has proven difficult to give.  But I 
can see no reason for supposing there to be such a natural distinction, and with the 
assumption rejected the problem of modal truth dissolves. 
 
6: Conclusion 
 
I have argued that the truthmaker for <Possibly, p> is simple any of the possible worlds 
that represents <p> as being true, and that the truthmaker for <Necessarily, p> is simply 
whatever makes it true that there is no truthmaker for <Possibly, ?p>.  The latter is going 
to be whatever makes it true that all the possible worlds are all the possible worlds (and 
here we tell whatever story concerning negative existentials that we tell elsewhere). 
 
And so we have a substantial account of modal truth – one that grounds modal truth 
without grounding it trivially (in the sense that modal truths are made true by any thing 
whatsoever).  There is, then, no risk of our being committed to a dualism about truth: 
modal truths are true in the same sense that any other truth is true – for <p> to be true is 
for it to correspond to the portion of reality that makes it true. 
 
Providing an ontological grounding for modal truths has seemed harder than it in fact is 
because of the assumption that the divide between the possible and the impossible is a 
natural one: with this unwarranted assumption rejected, the problem of modal truth loses 
its intractability. 
                                                 
44 Cf. Sider (2003). 
45 I don’t want to take a stand on what makes negative existentials true in this paper, although I do in 
Cameron (forthcoming c).  For alternative accounts see Martin (1996) and Armstrong (1997, 2004). 
46 Perhaps you think we shouldn’t ever posit truthmakers for negative existentials.  Fair enough; in that case 
you should hold that only truths of possibility have truthmakers, and that truths of necessity are true simply 
because the corresponding truth of possibility lacks a truthmaker.    There is only a pressure to locate 
truthmakers for both truths of possibility and truths of necessity if we accept truthmaker maximalism: the 
doctrine that every truth has a truthmaker, which I accept (see Fn. 9).  And if maximalism is accepted then 
we must have an account of the truthmakers for negative existentials in general: an account that we can 
then appeal to for the case of necessity. 
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